Nordyke v. King, WL 347009 (9th Circuit 2003)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9^th Circuit in a February 18 ruling questioned that circuit's recent anti-Second Amendment decision in Silveira v. Lockyer. One judge even wrote a concurrence showing the Second Amendment to guarantee individual rights. The National Rifle Association filed an amicus curiae brief in the case.

U.S. v. Emerson, No. 99-10331 (Fifth Circuit, 1999)
Emerson had been indicted for possessing a firearm while under a certain kind of restraining order, a violation of federal law. The trial court quashed the indictment on Second and Fifth Amendment grounds, finding that Emerson's right to arms had been restricted by a mere "boilerplate state court divorce order" and "an obscure, highly technical statute with no mens rea (criminal intent) requirement."

U.S. v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318 (Eighth Circuit, 1988).
This case is not a firearms case; it involves the federal switchblade knife act. Based on the holding in U.S. v. Cruikshank that the right to keep and bear arms "is not a right granted by the Constitution," the Eighth Circuit concluded that the right is not fundamental. Of course, the statement in Cruikshank—a case which involved the theft of firearms by private citizens from other private citizens—simply meant that the right was not created by the Constitution, but that it preexisted the Constitution and that the Second Amendment was "to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes" to the state criminal laws.

U.S. v. Cody, 460 F.2d 34 (Eighth Circuit, 1972).
This case involved the making of a false statement by a convicted felon in connection with the purchase of a firearm. The court held that there was "no evidence that the prohibition of 922(a)(6) obstructs the maintenance of a well-regulated militia." Thus, the court acknowledged that the Second Amendment would be a bar to some congressional regulation of the use or possession of firearms and recognized that Miller required the introduction of evidence which showed a militia use for the firearm involved.

U.S. v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (Eighth Circuit, 1971).
The court held that the defendant could "present . . . evidence indicating a conflict" between the statute at issue and the Second Amendment. Since he failed to do so, the court declined to hold that the record-keeping requirements of the Gun Control Act of 1968 violated the Second Amendment. The court once again implicitly recognized that the right guaranteed belonged to individuals.

U.S. v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (Eighth Circuit, 1971)
This is another case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court held that 18 U.S.C. App. Section 1202(a) (reenacted in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) in 1986) did not infringe the Second Amendment, as there was "no showing that prohibiting possession of firearms by felons obstructs the maintenance of a ‘well regulated militia.'" There was a clear recognition that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right.

Gilbert Equipment Co., Inc. v. Higgins, 709 F. Supp. 1071(S.D. Ala. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 412 (11th Circuit, 1990) (mem).
The court held that the Second Amendment "guarantees to all Americans ‘the right to keep and bear arms.'. . ."

U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Circuit, 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
Although the court recognized the requirement of Miller that the defendant show that the firearm in question have a "connection to the militia," the court concluded, without explanation, that the mere fact that the defendant was a member of the Kansas militia would not establish that connection. In light of the fact that Miller (which defines the militia as including "all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense") saw no relevance in the status of a defendant with respect to the militia, but instead focused upon the firearm itself, this conclusion is not without basis.

U.S. v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Circuit, 1975).
In the context of interpreting the meaning of the phrase "engaging in the business of dealing in firearms" in 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1), the court noted, in dicta, merely that "there is no absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm." Clearly, therefore, the court recognized that the right is an individual one, albeit not an absolute one.

U.S. v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (Fourth Circuit, 1974).
This is one of the three court of appeals cases that uses the term "collective right." The entire opinion, however, is one sentence, which states that the Second Amendment "only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms which must bear a ‘reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.'" The case concerned the interstate transportation of a firearm by convicted felons, a class of persons which historically has suffered the loss of numerous rights (including exclusion from the militia) accorded other citizens.

U.S. v. Bowdach, 414 F. Supp. 1346 (D.S. Fla 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 1160 (Fifth Circuit, 1977).
The court held that "possession of the shotgun by a non-felon has no legal consequences. U.S. Const. Amend. II." In other words, a non-felon's right to possess a shotgun is guaranteed by the Second Amendment.

U.S. v. Johnson. Jr., 441 F.2d 1134 (Fifth Circuit, 1971).
This decision merely quotes from Miller the statement concerning the requirement of an evidentiary showing of a militia nexus and a consequent rejection, without even the briefest of analysis, of the defendant's challenging to the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). Apparently, the defendant failed to put on evidence, as required by Miller, that the firearm at issue had a militia use.

Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (Seventh Circuit, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
In rejecting a Second and 14th Amendment challenge to a village handgun ban, the court held that the Second Amendment, either of itself or by incorporation through the 14th Amendment, "does not apply to the states. . . ." The court, in dicta, went on, however, to "comment" on the "scope of the second amendment," incorrectly summarizing Miller as holding that the right extends "only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia." Thus, finding (without evidence on the record) that "individually owned handguns [are not] military weapons," the court concluded that "the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the Second Amendment."

U.S. v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133 (Seventh Circuit, 1971).
This is another case involving the NFA in which the court merely followed Miller in holding that the NFA did not infringe the Second Amendment.

Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (Sixth Circuit, 1971).
In a one sentence holding, the court simply concluded that the Second Amendment "applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms. . . ." Merely citing Miller as authority for this conclusion, the court undertook no analysis of Miller or of the history of the ratification of the Second Amendment. This case, moreover, involved possession of firearms by convicted felons, a class of persons whose right traditionally have been more restricted than law-abiding citizens.

U.S. v. Day, 476 F.2d 562 (Sixth Circuit, 1973).
Citing Miller, the court merely concluded, in reviewing a challenge to the statute barring dishonorably discharged persons from possessing firearms, that "there is no absolute right of an individual to possess a firearm." Since there are certain narrowly defined classes of untrustworthy persons, such as convicted felons and, as here, persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, who may be barred the possession of firearms, it is a truism to say that there is not an absolute right to possess firearms. In so saying, the court implicitly recognized the individual right of peaceful and honest citizens to possess firearm.

U S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (Sixth Circuit, 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
Following its earlier decision in Stevens, the court simply concluded, without any reference to the history of the Second Amendment, that it "is clear the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right." Warin erred in concluding that the defendant's relationship to the militia was relevant to determining whether his possession of a machine gun was protected by the Second Amendment since the Supreme Court in Miller focused on the firearm itself, not the individual involved. In fact, Miller quite expansively defined the constitutional militia as encompassing "all males physically capable of action in concert for the common defense."

U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (Third Circuit, 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
This is another case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Despite holding that the failure of the defendant to prove, as required by Miller, a militia use for the firearm was an adequate basis for ruling against the defendant, the court, in dicta, concluded that the Second Amendment "was not adopted with individual rights in mind. . . ." This result was based on reliance on an extremely brief and erroneous analysis of common law and colonial history. In addition, apparently recognizing that it decided the case on unnecessarily broad grounds, the court noted that, at common law, while there was a right to bear arms, that right was not absolute and could be restricted for certain classes of persons "who have previously . . . been shown to be aggressors against society."

U.S. v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (Third Circuit, 1977).
Since the defendant in this case did not raise the Second Amendment as a challenge to the "statutory program which restricts the right to bear arms of convicted felons and other persons of dangerous propensities," the only discussion of the Second Amendment is found in a bartnote wherein the court states "[a]rguably, any regulation of firearms may be violative of this constitutional provision."

Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (First Circuit, 1942), cert. denied sub nom., Velazquez v. U. S., 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
The court held that the Supreme Court in Miller had not intended "to formulate a general rule" regarding which arms were protected by the Second Amendment and concluded, therefore, that many types of arms were not protected. Nonetheless, the court expressly acknowledged that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right when it noted that the law in question "undoubtedly curtails to some extent the right of individuals to keep and bear arms. . . ."